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INTRODUCTION 
he Arctic Ocean remains one of the last frontier regions on earth 
to be explored and exploited. “However, due to [climate 
change], technological advances, and declining stocks of global 
resources, increasing interest and activity in the Arctic is underway.”1 
This renewed interest in the Arctic has sparked a new vigor by the 
littoral states,2 whose shores border our world’s smallest and most 
northern ocean, and by the technologically able non-Arctic states, who 
are anxious for access to vast resources beneath the ice-laden surface 
of the region.3 
The Arctic Ocean isn’t currently governed by any form of 
comprehensive, multilateral, and legal framework recognized by the 
Arctic nations because, historically, it was never expected to become a 
navigable waterway or a site for large-scale, commercial development.4 
Recent attempts by the United Nations to address this issue have come 
away without ratification by all Arctic nations.5 
Scott G. Borgerson (International Affairs Fellow at the Council on 
Foreign Relations and a former Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. 
Coast Guard) reports that the Arctic ice caps are melting fast because 
of global warming, which is creating access to natural resources and 
enabling shortcuts for ships. Additionally, the area does not have any 
clear, governing rules, so the Arctic may become an area of armed 
conflict. Thus, the United States must form a multilateral, diplomatic 
solution.6 
 
1 Christopher Mark Macneill, Gaining Command & Control of the Northwest Passage: 
Strait Talk on Sovereignty, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 355, 356 (2007); see generally Arctic Sea Ice 
Minimum, NASA, https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/arctic-sea-ice [https://perma.cc/ 
QZM5-39LY] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). “Arctic sea ice is now declining at a rate of 12.85 
percent per decade” since 1979. Id. 
2 See HEATHER CONLEY & JAMIE KRAUT, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., U.S. 
STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC (Apr. 2010), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/100426_Conley_USStrategicInterests_Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GF9K-H5MT]. Littoral states are Russia, Canada, the United States, 
Denmark (Greenland), and Norway. Id. 
3 Barret Weber, Increased Shipping in the International Arctic? An Overview, 43 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 301, 306 (2012). “China, Korea, Germany and so on, show unprecedented 
interest in Arctic developments.” Id. 
4 See generally GOVERNING THE NORTH AMERICAN ARCTIC: SOVEREIGNTY, 
SECURITY, AND INSTITUTIONS (Dawn Alexandrea Berry, Nigel Bowles & Halbert Jones 
eds., 2016). 
5 Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of 
Global Warming, FOREIGN AFF. 63, 64–65 (Mar.–Apr. 2008). 
6 Id. at 73–77. 
T 
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“The ultimate problem involving the access and sovereignty rights 
to the [Arctic Ocean’s seabed] is one of ‘command and control.’ ”7 
Namely, who should control access to the vast untapped reserves of 
energy and mineral resources the region potentially offers the world, 
and similarly, who, if any, should control the important shipping access 
to the region? 
Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the course of opinion 
and practice with respect to the sea was originally based on the 
presumption that the world’s seas could be appropriated.8 Throughout 
history, the world’s seas and oceans were effectively appropriated in 
some instances; in many other instances, ineffective nations postured 
and grandstanded with respect to their national aspirations for 
domination of the seas and world trade.9 According to A Treatise on 
International Law, with respect to nations’ territorial claims of the sea, 
as appropriation of the larger areas was found to be generally unreal, 
to be burdensome to strangers, and to be unattended by compensating 
advantages, a disinclination to submit to it arose, and partly through 
insensible abandonment, partly through opposition to the exercise of 
inadequate or intermittent control, the larger claims disappeared, and 
those only continued at last to be recognized which affected waters 
the possession of which was supposed to be necessary to the safety 
of a state, or which were thought to be within its power to 
command.10 
While Russia may aspire to control the whole Arctic, it is a vast 
ocean and territory with numerous Arctic nations sharing its coastline, 
and inevitably, it will prove impossible for Russia to gain and maintain 
its control from other Arctic nations. Whereas, the United Nations 
Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has provided each 
nation a demarcated territorial sea, security of its coastline based on its 
continental shelf, and any accepted underwater extensions that the U.N. 
approves. 
 
7 Macneill, supra note 1, at 356. 
8 Marvin S. Soroos, The International Commons: A Historical Perspective, 12 ENVTL. 
REV. 1, 13–14 (1988). 
9 WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, M.A., A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 147–50 (3d 
ed. 1890). 
10 Id. at 150. 
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I 
STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
This Article explores the substantive merit of Russia’s sovereignty 
claims over the extension of its 200-nautical-mile continental shelf 
limit via the Lomonosov Ridge to include an additional 150 nautical 
miles reaching almost to the North Pole.11 In particular, the issue is 
whether Russia’s claims are justified and what legal premises support 
its position. In view of counter claims by Canada, Denmark 
(Greenland), and the littoral states in the region, this Article also 
attempts to identify the inherent conflict within the competing 
sovereignty claims and potential alternatives for amicably resolving an 
appropriate international legal framework for the region. 
First, this Article commences with a historical examination of the 
development of the international law in relation to the propriety of the 
sea. Next, this Article discusses contemporary law as developed by the 
1958 and 1982 UNCLOS. Then, this Article reviews competing claims 
of sovereignty over large sections of the Arctic by Russia, Denmark 
(Greenland),12 and Canada. Finally, this Article presents a set of 
solutions to consider for resolving the competing claims and 
jurisdictional issues in the Arctic. 
II 
INSUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE OPEN SEA TO BE APPROPRIATED AS 
PROPERTY: A HISTORICAL EXAMINATION 
Historically, it was assumed and established as customary 
international law “that states are unable to maintain effective control 
over large spaces of sea, so as to be able to reserve their use to  
 
 
11 ITSSD Charitable Mission, UNCLOS Ratification Would Provide a ‘Shield of U.S. 
Sovereignty’ Against EU & Environmentalist-Inspired ‘Lawfare’??, INST. FOR FREE 
TRADE, STANDARDS & SUSTAINABLE DEV. J. ON U.N. L. SEA CONVENTION BLOG (May 7, 
2008, 5:44 PM), https://itssdjournalunclos-lost.blogspot.com/2008/05/unclos-ratification-
would-provide.html [https://perma.cc/N2CT-SLEK] (citing Bernard H. Oxman, The 
Territorial Temptation: Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830 (2006)). 
12 Greenland is a Danish province, and it received home rule in 1979. Greenland Profile, 
BBC NEWS (July 23, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18249474 [https:// 
perma.cc/49ES-52PT]. Greenland is the world’s largest island and is located between the 
Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. Id. While geographically and ethnically an Arctic island and 
Inuit (Eskimo) nation associated with the continent of North America, Greenland’s political 
and economic history is associated with Europe, specifically Denmark, Norway,  
and Iceland. Rasmus Ole Rasmussen, Greenland, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Greenland/History [https://perma.cc/N26B-B5JU] (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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themselves, it is a principle of international law that the sea is in general 
insusceptible of appropriation as property.”13 However, at the same 
time, it was also broadly recognized that portions of the seas, as W.E. 
Hall pointed out in 1890, “are affected by proprietary rights on the part 
of the states of which the territory is washed by it; but no distinct 
understanding has yet been come to as to the extent which may be 
appropriated, or which may be considered to be attendant on the 
bordering land.”14 
During the sixteenth century, when W.E. Hall argues international 
law came into existence,15 the common European practice for 
allocating rights to the sea was founded upon the possibility of the 
acquisition of property in it, and it was customary to look upon most 
seas as being, in fact, appropriated.16 During this period and preceding, 
Spain and Portugal, respectively, asserted dominion over the Pacific, 
the Gulf of Mexico, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic south of 
Morocco.17 Under their claims, sovereignty was extended over the seas 
of their dominion to exclude all foreigners from access and navigation 
on their waters.18 This position logically and historically was met with 
opposition and proved impossible to enforce, as noted by Queen 
Elizabeth I of England’s response to Spanish opposition to English 
vessels in the waters of the Indies: 
[S]he refused to admit any right in Spain to debar her subjects from 
trade, or from ‘freely navigating that vast ocean, seeing the use of the 
sea and air is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean belong to 
any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public 
use and custom permitteth any possession thereof.’ Elizabeth was 
indifferent to consistency. If the principle which she enunciated was 
correct, it applied as fully to the British seas as to those of the 
Indies.19 
 
13 HALL, supra note 9, at 62. 
14 Id. at 139. 
15 Id. at 141. 
16 Ricardo J. Romulo, Unclos: ‘Mare Liberum’ or ‘Mare Clausum’?, INQUIRER.NET 
(Aug. 13, 2016, 12:31 AM), https://opinion.inquirer.net/96462/unclos-mare-liberum-or-
mare-clausum [https://perma.cc/9K5L-TGRE]. “In the 17th century, John Selden published 
his work, ‘Mare Clausum sen de Domino Maris Libri Duo,’ which translates to ‘closed 
seas.’ ” Id. Mare Clausum advocates “use and exploitation only to states with naval 
capabilities, particularly England.” Id. 
17 HALL, supra note 9, at 141–42. 
18 Charles Leben, Hebrew Sources in the Doctrine of the Law of Nature and Nations in 
Early Modern Europe, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 79, 97 (2016). 
19 HALL, supra note 9, at 142. As Hall further explained, 
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Between the sixteenth and seventeenth century, international law 
underwent a transition as the world began balancing rights to 
navigation with the fundamental right of access to the sea for public 
enjoyment and state sovereignty over coastal resources that accompany 
ownership.20 During this period, the position of a renowned Dutch 
jurist, Grotius, “espoused in his works Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli 
ac Pacis, was that states may not individually or collectively acquire 
high seas areas. This view was disputed at the time by various writers, 
especially John Selden (1584–1654).”21 
Selden and other jurists of the seventeenth century agreed that while 
the right of appropriation was a principle of customary law, a state that 
holds right to the sea cannot prohibit navigation if the sea is accessible 
by others without compromising basic, fundamental obligations to their 
 
It was essentially the same as that on which Grotius relied in his attack upon the 
Portuguese in the “Mare Liberum.” All property, he says, is grounded upon 
occupation, which requires that movables shall be seized and that immovable things 
shall be enclosed; whatever therefore cannot be so seized or enclosed is incapable of 
being made a subject of property. The vagrant waters of the ocean are thus necessarily 
free. The right of occupation, again, rests upon the fact that most things become 
exhausted by promiscuous use, and that appropriation consequently is the condition 
of their utility to human beings. But this is not the case with the sea; it can be 
exhausted neither by navigation nor by fishing, that is to say in neither of the two 
ways in which it can be used. 
Id. at 142–43. 
20 Leben, supra note 18, at 104–05. 
21 W.E. Butler, Grotius and the Law of the Sea, in HUGO GROTIUS & INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 209 (Hedley Bull et al. eds., Oxford Scholarship Online 2003) (1992), 
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198277717.001.0001/acprof-
9780198277712-chapter-6 [https://perma.cc/7CE9-ZJ7K]. “However, it eventually came to 
be the foundation of the modern regime of the high seas. The 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea constitutes a continuation of the balancing process between coastal and high 
seas interests to which Grotius had contributed.” Id. 
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neighbors and mankind.22 But, by the end of the eighteenth century, 
these proprietary rights over the open sea had broadly deteriorated.23 
During the nineteenth century, Russia was the last nation to claim 
sovereignty over a large body of the sea when it established its 
sovereignty of the Pacific lying north of latitude 51° and prohibited 
foreign vessels from approaching that region of the ocean.24 During the 
end of the nineteenth century and commencement of the twentieth 
century, jurists seemed at odds over freedom of the seas versus 
ownership and sovereignty.25 Some scholars believed the sea should be 
subject to proprietary rights, while others rejected ownership of the 
sea.26 Hall summarized the customary view at the time as “[t]he true 
 
22 HALL, supra note 9, at 143–44. 
[F]luidity is not in itself a bar to property, as is proved by the case of rivers; that 
though the sea is inexhaustible for some purposes, its fish, and the pearls, the coral, 
and the amber that it yields, are not inexhaustible, and that “there is no reason why 
the borderers should not rather challenge to themselves the happiness of a wealthy 
shore or sea than those who are seated at a distance from it;” finally, that the sea is a 
defence [sic], “for which reason it must be a disadvantage to any people that other 
nations should have free access to their shores with ships of war without asking their 
leave, or without giving security for their peaceful and inoffensive passage.” The 
extent over which dominion exists in any particular case is to be determined from the 
facts of effective possession or from treaties; and in cases which, after the application 
of these tests, are doubtful, it is to be presumed that the sea belongs to the states 
bordering on it so far as may be necessary for their defence [sic], and that they also 
own all gulfs and arms. 
Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 147–48. 
This pretension was resisted by the United States and Great Britain, and was wholly 
given up by Conventions between the former powers and Russia in 1824 and 1825. 
So late as 1875 Russia seems to have made a claim elsewhere to property in some 
considerable extent of water, for in that year Mr. Fish, the American Secretary of 
State, wrote “There was reason to hope that the practice which formerly prevailed 
with powerful nations of regarding seas and bays usually of large extent near their 
coast as closed to any foreign commerce or fishery not specially licensed by them, 
was, without exception, a pretension of the past, and that no nation would claim 
exemption from the general rule of public law which limits its maritime jurisdiction 
to a marine league from its coasts. We should particularly regret if Russia should 
insist on any such pretension.” With flagrant inconsistency the United States, since 
acquiring possession of Alaska, have claimed as attendant upon it, by virtue of 
cession from Russia, about two thirds of the Behring Sea,—a space 1500 miles long 
and 600 miles wide. 
Id. at 147–48 n.2 (footnotes omitted). 
25 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 16–17 (Cambridge U. 
Press, 2d ed. 2015). 
26 HALL, supra note 9, at 149–50. 
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key to the development of the law is to be sought in the principle that 
maritime occupation must be effective in order to be valid.”27 
III 
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE DEEP SEABED 
A. The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Generally, the Law of the Sea is interesting because it represents the 
first successful attempt of the United Nations International Law 
Commission to develop a large segment of international law on a 
multilateral treaty basis.28 In 1956, the International Law Commission 
submitted Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with Commentaries 
to the United Nations General Assembly with eighty-six states 
participating. The first two conventions in 1958 and 1960 produced 
four conventions: (1) the Convention on Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone, (2) Convention on the High Seas, (3) Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, and (4) Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas.29 
Essentially, the first four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea 
produced from the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of The 
Sea were only a starting point, albeit a very impressive beginning from 
an organizational perspective.30 The Conventions did not address basic 
questions, such as fishing rights beyond the territorial sea, but did 
address “the width of the territorial seas and the establishment of an 
equitable international regime for the seabed and the ocean floor and 
 
It was universally felt that states cannot maintain effective occupation at a distance 
from their shores, and that free commercial navigation had become necessary to the 
modern world. There was therefore a general willingness to declare the ocean to be 
free, and to consider states as holding waters, which might fairly be looked upon as 
territorial, subject to a right of navigation on the part of other states. But acceptance 
of the freedom of the open seas merely marked a stage in a gradual settlement of the 
conditions under which occupation, when applied to the sea, may be held to be valid; 
and recognition of the right of passage only saddled private property with a kind of 
servitude for the general good. 
Id. 
27 Id. at 150. 
28 Tullio Treves, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL 
LIBR. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2008). 
29 Tullio Treves, 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL 
LIBR. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2008). 
30 See generally Unresolved Issues Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, in 
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND NEW CHALLENGES TO THE LAW OF THE SEA: TIME BEFORE AND 
TIME AFTER 1 (Anastasia Strati, Maria Gavouneli & Nikolaos Skourtos eds., 2006). 
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the subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”31 A regime for 
the deep seabed was considered a necessity,32 and 
[i]n 1969, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 2574 
(XXIV) calling for a moratorium on deep seabed activities and a year 
later a Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean 
Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (“the Area”) was adopted. This provided that the Area 
and its resources were the “common heritage of mankind” and could 
not be appropriated, and that no rights at all could be acquired over it 
except in conformity with an international regime to be established 
to govern its exploration and exploitation.33 
To address the remaining unresolved problems, the Seabed, Ocean 
Floor Declaration flowed to 
the impetus behind the [United Nations] General Assembly’s 
decisions in its Resolution 2750 of 17 December 1970. . . . [This 
called for the 1973 Conference.] This conference on the law of the 
sea . . . examine[d] the above listed problems and would also deal 
with issues concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental 
shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its breadth and the 
question of international straits and contiguous zone), fishing and 
conservation of the living resources of the high seas (including the 
question of preferential rights of coastal States), the preservation of 
the marine environment (including, inter alia, the prevention of 
pollution) and scientific research.34 
The term common heritage of mankind is often confused with the 
term res nullius, which is a Roman property law concept literally 
meaning “property of no one.”35 As Rosalyn Higgins, former President 
of the International Court of Justice, noted, the 
notion of common heritage over a resource was different from the 
perception of, for example, fish in the waters of the high seas. In the 
latter case, fish were res nullius—that is to say, belonging to no one, 
and therefore exploitable by anyone who wished to, and was in 
position to, exploit them. But a resource that was termed a “common 
heritage” apparently meant something different: it meant a resource 
 
31 MAZEN ADI, THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE CONVENTION ON 
THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 12 (2009). 
32 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,  
DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. & L. SEA, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm [https://perma.cc/JF7S-M3PK] (last 
updated Feb. 11, 2020). 
33 MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 561 (5th ed. 2003). 
34 ADI, supra note 31 (alteration in original). 
35 F.S. Ruddy, Res Nullius and Occupation in Roman and International Law, 36 U. MO. 
KAN. CITY L. REV. 274, 274 (1968). 
MACNEILL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:30 PM 
236 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 35, 227 
that could, like fish swimming above it, in principle be exploited by 
anyone—but only with the permission of the world community and 
upon such conditions as the institutions representing that community 
would lay down. It is hard to see any reason of logic why, in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, resources in water (fish, plankton, 
indeed the water itself) should be treated as res nullius; whereas in 
those same areas resources located in the sea-bed, rather than in the 
water above it, should be treated as falling under a different regime—
one in which the legal consequences of commonality and lack of state 
jurisdiction would be treated differently. But of course it was not 
simply a matter of logic. There were economic and political 
considerations at play. The economic consideration was that the 
resources of the deep sea-bed were likely to be of profoundly more 
commercial value than the fish that swim above them. And we live 
in a world of finite and dwindling natural resources. The political 
consideration at play was that the res nullius approach to 
commonality meant that, while anyone could exploit these resources, 
in fact only a few did so.36 
Advanced states’ wealth and technological endowment provide a 
comparative advantage over underdeveloped states in regard to access, 
exploration, and exploitation of deep seabed resources when the system 
is regulated under the principle of jus humanitas37 (i.e., the common 
heritage of mankind). Thus, essentially because of an imbalance in 
economic and technological might and know-how, the common 
heritage of mankind resources will ultimately fall into the hands of the 
few.38 Although Higgins responds with the logical counterargument 
that “it made good sense for those states with the financial and technical 
capability to do the physical exploring and exploiting; what did matter 
was that these resources should then be made available . . . to the 
community . . . . Whether one agrees with this will depend upon one’s 
political philosophy.”39 The majority of the General Assembly 
obviously found this rationale as unacceptable, and the notion of the 
common heritage of mankind was normatively embraced.40 The result 
 
36 ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 130–31 (1994). 
37 Ian Ward, Universal Jurisprudence and the Case for Legal Humanism, 38 ALTA. L. 
REV. 941, 942 (2001). 
38 HIGGINS, supra note 36. 
39 Id. at 131. 
40 Id. The U.N.’s General Assembly majority 
also took the view that prices would inevitably be set by those who did the physical 
exploring and exploiting, and that the resources would often be put on the market at 
a price beyond the reach of the poor countries, making common access to a resource 
beyond any single state’s jurisdiction an illusion. 
Id. 
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was that the General Assembly passed a resolution calling for a 
moratorium on the exploitation of the deep seabed pending the 
conclusion of an international agreement as to how the legal regime of 
the common heritage of mankind would operate.41 
Unfortunately, nations resisted the U.N. recommended moratorium 
on the exploitation of the deep seabed.42 Higgins raises the question of 
whether it is really unlawful under general international law for a state 
unilaterally to attempt to exploit the mineral resources of the deep 
seabed. To which, she cites the BP-Texaco case: 
where the UN resolutions had to have the support of the major actors 
in the practice in question (the capital-investing countries, in that 
case), the case would not seem to be made for the “common heritage 
of mankind” to be regarded as a compulsory norm. But the matter is 
not entirely analogous to BP–Texaco—the support of the great 
majority of UN members for the common-heritage approach was 
evidenced by the text of a negotiated treaty, and that text was 
approved by many of the industrialized governments—albeit at the 
end of the day they did not ratify.43 
B. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
It was under the political environment described above that, after 
nine long years of negotiations, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the 
Sea was adopted.44 This new version of the Law of the Sea contains 
320 articles and nine annexes (including many commenced in the four 
1958 Conventions) and was established in 1994.45 The Convention 
aimed to “contribute to the realization of a just and equitable 
international economic order which takes into account the interests and 
needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and 
needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked.”46 
 
41 John Alton Duff, UNCLOS and the New Deep Seabed Mining Regime: The Risks of 
Refuting the Treaty, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1995). 
42 HIGGINS, supra note 36, at 131–32. “[V]irtually all the states concerned took domestic 
legal powers to exploit the deep sea-bed when the moment might be ripe.” Id. at 132. 
43 Id. at 132–33. 
44 JOE BIDEN, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, S. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 110-9, at 2 (1st Sess. 2007). 
45 See Duncan E.J. Currie, Sovereignty and Conflict in the Arctic Due to Climate 
Change: Climate Change and the Legal Status of the Arctic Ocean, GLOBE L. 1, 6 (Aug. 5, 
2007), http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/Climate_Change_and_Arctic_Sovereignty.html 
[https://perma.cc/G6YU-AQXZ]. 
46 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 398. 
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Under the 1982 Convention, the deep seabed and its resources are 
deemed to be the common heritage of mankind, and no sovereignty or 
other rights may be recognized.47 As an applied principle, this infers 
that 
[m]inerals recovered from the Area [deep sea-bed] in accordance 
with the Convention are alienable, however. Activities in the Area 
are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole by or on 
behalf of the International Seabed Authority (the Authority) 
established under the Convention. The Authority is to provide for the 
equitable sharing of such benefits.48 
However, under UNCLOS Article 76, a state can claim a 200-
nautical-mile exclusive zone.49 The baseline from which these 
distances are measured depends on where the continental shelf ends.50 
The North Pole region is considered international territory in 
international law and is administered by the International Seabed 
Authority.51 
At least one problem remains with the fact that the 1982 UNCLOS 
had not been initiated with respect to whether the new definition of 
outer limits of the continental shelf now represents customary 
international law or not.52 It has also been noted that under both the 
1958 and 1982 Conventions, “the coastal state has sovereign 
jurisdiction for purposes of the exploration and exploitation of the 
 
47 Michael W. Lodge, The Common Heritage of Mankind, 27 INT’L J. MARINE & 
COASTAL L. 733, 733 (2012). 
48 SHAW, supra note 33, at 561–62 (citations omitted). 
49 Sarra Sefrioui, Adapting to Sea Level Rise: A Law of the Sea Perspective, in THE 
FUTURE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA: BRIDGING GAPS BETWEEN NATIONAL, INDIVIDUAL AND 
COMMON INTERESTS 3, 5 (Gemma Andreone ed., 2017) (ebook). 
50 Id. 
However, since the coastal State’s right to outer limits of continental shelf relies not 
only on the 200 nautical miles rule but also on the “natural prolongation” criterion, 
it implies that the outer limits of the continental shelf must not always be measured 
from baselines. The coastal State has sovereign rights over this area in respect to the 
exploration and exploitation of natural resources (article 77 § 1 UNCLOS). Finally, 
the high seas are not subject to the State’s sovereignty and are located beyond the 
external limit of the EEZ [exclusive economic zones] (as a maximum of 200 miles 
from the baselines) (article 86 UNCLOS). The outer limit of all these zones are 
determined and delimited from baselines except for one of the situations where outer 
limits of continental shelf exceed 200 nautical miles. 
Id. 
51 See generally Laura Neilson Bonikowsky, The Arctic, Country by Country, 
DIPLOMAT & INT’L CAN. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://diplomatonline.com/mag/2012/10/the-arctic-
country-by-country [https://perma.cc/SU83-2X9M]. 
52 HIGGINS, supra note 36, at 132. 
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resource.”53 This is essentially a form of “functional sovereignty” and 
flies against the objective of UNCLOS, as described in its preamble.54 
Finally, Higgins also identifies a significant, inherent constraint in 
the legal framework of UNCLOS whereby separation of private 
ownership in the “property” of the offshore resources causes problems 
with capitalizing the exploration and exploitation of minerals using 
international capital because title is required as collateral security for 
lending purposes.55 In essence, 
[i]f on-shore mineral resources have been vested in the state, it is 
clear that it owns them. But it has no right of ownership in the 
resources in situ in the continental shelf—it has only sovereignty for 
the purposes of exploring and exploiting. This means no-one else 
may explore and exploit without permission; that it may grant 
licenses for that purpose; but it does not itself “own” the petroleum. 
What then does a licensee of off-shore petroleum get? . . . But the 
holder of an off-shore license cannot thereby get title to a resource 
over which the licensing government does not itself get title. It gets, 
instead, an entitlement to explore and exploit (which action would 
otherwise be illegal) and to reduce into possession. It is the actual 
reduction into possession which gives the licensee title. Thus it is, for 
example, that in the North Sea title passes not with the granting of 
the license but at the well-head, when the recovered petroleum is 
reduced into possession.56 
This issue is also significant to the potential licensee of the 
exploration and exploitation leases because the UNCLOS legal 
framework implicitly means that “what is altered or taken is not the 
title to petroleum, but the entitlement to reduce the petroleum into 
possession.”57 
While the United States has signed the Convention, it has not ratified 
it because it opposes several provisions of the Convention, including 
the Convention’s seabed provision. “Concern was particularly 
expressed regarding the failure to provide assured access to seabed 
minerals, lack of a proportionate voice in decision-making for countries 
most affected, and the problems that would be caused by not permitting 
the free play of market forces in the development of seabed 
 
53 Id. at 137. The implication is most significant in that it means states have had to be 
careful in presenting policy and legislation pertaining to the shelf to ensure that it is limited 
to the exploration and exploitation of the shelf resources. Id. 
54 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
55 Id. at 138. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
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resources.”58 As well, it would appear that other states are at odds with 
the effect of the Convention on the seabed, raising concern over its 
legal credence on the international stage.59 
At an international level, the Arctic circumpolar region is closely 
monitored and collectively guided to a large extent by the Arctic 
Council, which is referred to as a supranational governance structure.60 
The Arctic Council is a multilateral organization created and composed 
of the previously identified eight Arctic circumpolar states and  
six indigenous organizations that are designated as permanent 
participants.61 It was established in 1996 in order to promote 
cooperation among the Arctic states62 and to address environmental 
issues.63 In the process of creating the Arctic Council, the United States 
restricted its scope by insisting the Council refrain from addressing 
security concerns.64 “Since it is the national environmental laws of the 
eight Arctic states that apply in their Arctic areas, the most the Arctic 
Council has been able to do . . . has been to adopt guidelines and 
recommendations on how the Arctic states should apply their 
regulations in those areas.”65 The Arctic Council’s 2004 Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment found that “[t]he Arctic is extremely vulnerable to 
 
58 SHAW, supra note 33, at 563. 
59 See id. 
60 Bernard P. Herber, Economic Change in the Arctic: Is the Antarctic Governance 
Model Needed? 5–6 (Univ. Ariz. Envtl. Policy Working Paper, 2013), http://www. 
udallcenter.arizona.edu/eppubs/herber_economic_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/GVB8-9XWT]. 
61 Supreme Audit Institutions of Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and 
the United States of America, A Joint Memorandum of a Multilateral Audit on the Arctic 
States’ National Authorities’ Work with the Arctic Council 3 (May 5, 2015), 
http://www.rigsrevisionen.dk/media/2038912/Joint-memorandum-2015.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/T9V3-RLP8] [hereinafter Supreme Audit, Joint Memorandum]. 
62 Erika M. Zimmerman, Comment, Valuing Traditional Ecological Knowledge: 
Incorporating the Experiences of Indigenous People into Global Climate Change Policies, 
13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 803, 834 (2005). The Arctic Council is described as 
an intergovernmental forum that addresses the concerns of Arctic people and 
governments consisting of the eight Arctic states (Canada, Denmark/ 
Greenland/Faroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United 
States) as well as six indigenous people’s organizations (the Aleut International 
Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, 
and Saami Council). 
Id. 
63 Supreme Audit, Joint Memorandum, supra note 61, at 1. 
64 Wilfrid Greaves, Canada, Circumpolar Security, & The Arctic Council, NORTHERN 
PUB. AFF. 58, 58–59 (2013). 
65 Timo Koivurova, Environmental Protection in the Arctic and Antarctic: Can the 
Polar Regimes Learn from Each Other?, 33 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 204, 214 (2005). 
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observed and projected climate change and its impacts. The Arctic is 
now experiencing some of the most rapid and severe climate change on 
earth.”66 
The Indigenous people of the Arctic nations collectively represent 
one million people and represent the majority of the Arctic inhabitants 
in Canada and Greenland.67 The Indigenous people are the customary 
residents of the Arctic region and now have high-level input in the 
region via the Arctic Council.68 Their professed rights include the right 
to hunt, safety next to future shipping lanes, and share of economic 
benefits derived from the Arctic.69 
The division of Canada’s Northwest Territory and the creation of the 
Nunavut Territory and Yukon Territory indicate that all of the northern 
territories of the Canadian Arctic are on devolutionary tracks to become 
self-governing provinces within a new Canadian confederation.70 
“Canada has committed to a renewed, nation-to-nation relationship 
with Indigenous peoples based on recognition of rights, respect,  
co-operation and partnership, and rooted in the principles of the  
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
[UNDRIP].”71 The declaration was adopted by the General Assembly 
on September 13, 2007, and was voted against by Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United States.72 Subsequently, in November 
 
66 Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic 
Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human 
Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 31 (2007) (quoting SUSAN JOY HASSOL, IMPACTS OF A 
WARMING ARTIC: ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 10 (2004), https://acia.amap.no 
[https://perma.cc/X47U-5QV6]). 
67 Indigenous Population in the Arctic, NORDREGIO (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www. 
nordregio.org/maps/indigenous-population-in-the-arctic [https://perma.cc/YK3D-MP3V]. 
68 DEAN ALLISON, CANADA AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL: AN AGENDA FOR REGIONAL 
LEADERSHIP, 41ST PARLIAMENT, REP. STANDING COMMITTEE FOREIGN AFF. & INT’L 
DEV., at 5 (1st Sess. 2013). 
69 Borgerson, supra note 5, at 73. 
70 Stephanie Irlbacher-Fox & Stephen J. Mills, Devolution and Resource Revenue 
Sharing in the Canadian North: Achieving Fairness Across Generations, CHRISTIAN 
ABORIGINAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEV. 19, http://caid.ca/ResRevShaCanNor2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JB3D-GMTM] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
71 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, INDIGENOUS & 
NORTHERN AFF. CAN., https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374407406/1309374458958 
[https://perma.cc/8QQF-ABVY] (last updated Aug. 3, 2017) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. 
72 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. DEPT. ECON. 
& SOCIAL AFF., https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-
the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html [https://perma.cc/N8K7-KH4E] (last visited Feb. 23, 
2020). There were eleven abstentions: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, 
Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Samoa, and Ukraine. 
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2010, Canada formally endorsed UNDRIP in a manner consistent with 
Canada’s Constitution and laws.73 
The critical issues facing the circumpolar regions are “sustainability, 
subsistence living, community well-being, and self-government,”74 all 
of which must be balanced with a diverse array of dominating 
variables, such as climate change, economics, and political and social 
development.75 Other supranational entities that have emerged in 
response to an ever-growing interest in the Arctic are the Barents-Euro 
Arctic Council (regional cooperation among Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Russia); The Northern Forum (circumpolar forum of 
regions with Alaska as the headquarters); Nordic Council (five Nordic 
States plus Greenland and the Faroe Islands); and the EU76—although, 
it will be interesting to see the impact of Brexit in cultivating an active 
role in the Arctic and in developing policy on the preservation of Arctic 
resources. 
The race for the Arctic goes beyond the supranational organizations 
and riparian states identified above and also includes a strong 
international lobby by other nations, such as China, claiming “Near-
Arctic State” status who have expansive interests77 and will likely push 
for an international model of Arctic global management similar to the 
Antarctic.78 The conflicting claims of sovereignty for Antarctica 
essentially led to agreement and collaboration of states with vested 
interests to recognize each other’s disagreement. Rather than disputing  
 
 
73 U.N. Declaration, supra note 71. 
74 U. ARCTIC, INTRODUCTION TO THE CIRCUMPOLAR WORLD 4, https://core.ac.uk/ 
download/pdf/5211896.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRD9-KS3Q] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
75 Bachelor of Circumpolar Studies (BSC) 100: Introduction to the Circumpolar World, 
NORTHERN RES. PORTAL, http://scaa.usask.ca/gallery/northern/en_courses_bcs100.php 
[https://perma.cc/7MDX-9DY5] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
76 Adam Stepien & Andreas Raspotnik, The EU’s Arctic Future Following the Spring  
of Statements, ARCTIC PORTAL, https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2016/2016-
briefing-notes/206-the-eu-s-arctic-future-following-the-spring-of-statements  
[https://perma.cc/26ZU-VQXM] (last visited Feb. 21, 2020). 
77 In January 2018, China released “China’s Arctic Paper,” which claims “rights in 
respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and 
pipelines, . . . and rights to resource exploration and exploitation in the Area . . . and 
shoulders the important mission of jointly promoting peace and security in the Arctic.” 
Sherman Xiaogang Lai, China’s Arctic Policy and Its Potential Impact on Canada’s Arctic 
Security, CAN. NAVAL REV. (Apr. 17, 2019), http://cimsec.org/chinas-arctic-policy-and-its-
potential-impact-on-canadas-arctic-security/40180 [https://perma.cc/93HJ-LAZK] (quoting 
CHINA’S ARCTIC POLICY, STATE COUNCIL INFO. OFFICE CHINA (2018), http:// 
english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5JTM-RC6E]). 
78 Id. 
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and developing conflict, they worked collectively. In contrast, in the 
Arctic, the eight Arctic nations have long established sovereignty and 
history of governance in the Arctic circumpolar region, and it is 
recognized respectfully that these riparian nations have much at stake.79 
The governance structure in the circumpolar north is also shaped and 
directed by international law, such as UNCLOS, general international 
laws and precedence recognized by the International Court of Justice, 
and a myriad of respective state jurisdictional tools for power and 
controls, along with their respective economic, environmental, and 
national security policies.80 
IV 
COMPETING SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS TO THE ARCTIC:  
THE RACE IS ON! 
The Arctic region is commonly perceived as frozen polar seawater 
known as the Arctic Ocean, which is the smallest of the world’s five 
oceans,81 surrounded by vast and remote northern lands of North 
America, Europe, and Asia82 (e.g., Canada, the United States, Denmark 
[Greenland],83 Norway, and Russia all border the Arctic Ocean), and 
sparsely inhabited by small communities across all the Arctic states.84 
 
79 P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER & ROB HUEBERT, An Important International 
Crossroads, in (RE)CONCEPTUALIZING ARCTIC SECURITY: SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE 
JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, at i, iv (P. Whitney Lackenbauer et al. 
eds., 2017) (ebook). 
80 HEATHER EXNER-PIROT, Beyond the Arctic Council: Cooperation Needs and Gaps in 
the Arctic Region, in NORTH OF 60: TOWARD A RENEWED CANADIAN ARCTIC AGENDA 51, 
53–54 (John Higginbotham & Jennifer Spence eds., 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/ 
sites/default/files/north_of_60_special_report_lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EP4-DFC3]. 
81 Amanda Briney, Arctic Ocean or Arctic Seas, THOUGHTCO., https://www. 
thoughtco.com/arctic-seas-overview-1435183 [https://perma.cc/F8BE-5UY8] (last updated 
Nov. 6, 2019). 
82 Id. The Antarctic (in contrast to the Arctic) is both an uninhabitable continent and is 
surrounded by ocean, whereas the Arctic land mass is collectively inhabited by 
approximately one million indigenous Inuit people. From an international law perspective, 
a comparison of the Arctic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea has also been made in that it 
is a large sea body surrounded by littoral states, except in the latter case they have had clearer 
historical claims and it has not been rendered unnavigable by frozen ice cover. See 
Borgerson, supra note 5, at 73. 
83 Briney, supra note 81. “Sovereignty over Greenland is exercised by Denmark and 
Greenlanders are viewed by the Danish government as an indigenous people within 
Denmark.” Currie, supra note 45, at 3. 
84 Mona Elisabeth Brother, What Can the Arctic Governments Do About Climate Change?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2014, 5:59 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/mona-
elisabeth-brother/arctic-climate-change_b_5811612.html [https://perma.cc/3BT5-UYX3]. 
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“The Arctic Ocean features internal sea waters, territorial seas, 
contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones [EEZs], the high seas, the 
continental shelf, and seabed areas beyond the limits of the continental 
shelf.”85 See Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Map of maritime jurisdiction and boundaries in the Arctic region.86 
The Arctic Ocean’s seabed is about fifty percent continental shelf 87 
(highest percentage of all oceans) with a central basin that has three 
 
85 Currie, supra note 45, at 6. 
86 Map showing the coastal Arctic states, their joint Exclusive Economic Zones  
(EEZs), and the natural prolongations of their land territories. Reprinted by permission from 
IBRU: Centre for Borders Research, Arctic Maps, DURHAM U., U.K., full color version 
available at http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic [https://perma.cc/3XPD-XPFM] 
(last updated Jan. 20, 2020) [hereinafter IBRU]. 
87 In general terms, a continental shelf is the submerged border of a continent that slopes 
downward gradually and extends to a point of steeper descent to the ocean bottom. In 
legal terms, the continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of  
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submarine ridges running across its body and circumference (Alpha 
Cordillera, Nansen Cordillera, and Lomonosov Ridge).88 The 
Lomonosov Ridge, as noted, is one of the special features of the Arctic 
seabed, and Russia claims the underwater ridge, which crosses the 
Arctic Ocean between the New Siberian Islands and Ellesmere Island 
(Canada), representing an extension of its Asian continental shelf.89 See 
Figure 2. 
  
 
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea, throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory, to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance. 
Currie, supra note 45, at 10. 
88 Topography of the Ocean Floor, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www. 
britannica.com/place/Arctic-Ocean/Topography-of-the-ocean-floor [https://perma.cc/ 
M76W-2D4M] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
89 Michael Byers, The North Pole Is a Distraction, GLOBE & MAIL (Aug. 20, 2014), 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-north-pole-is-a-distraction/article20126915 
[https://perma.cc/VU3L-SYAV]. 
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Figure 2. Map of Russian claims to the Arctic.90 
This claim by Russia has been contested by Norway, the United 
States, Denmark (Greenland),91 and Canada. The latter two seek to 
establish before UNCLOS that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension 
of the North American continental shelf.92 The motive appears to be 
that if any of these countries are successful in establishing the 
Lomonosov Ridge as an extension of their continental shelf, then they 
may claim up to an additional 150 nautical miles of seabed rights (under 
UNCLOS Article 76) in the central area of the Arctic Ocean, which 
 
90 Reprinted by permission from IBRU, supra note 86, full color version available at 
http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic [https://perma.cc/3XPD-XPFM]. 
91 Alyona Burdina, Several Countries Lay Claim to Disputed Lomonosov Ridge, ARCTIC 
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://arctic.ru/analitic/20181115/804847.html [https://perma.cc/M3NZ-
9K6Q]. 
92 Id. 
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otherwise is considered res nullius,93 or the common heritage of 
mankind.94 With acceptance of their claims under UNCLOS,  the 
claimants will gain exclusive economic rights for that area’s Arctic 
seabed’s precious minerals and hydrocarbons.95 
A. Russia’s Arctic and Lomonosov Ridge Claims 
Russian legal claims over the Arctic go back to April 1926 (and 
further back to the period of 1824–1875)96 when the former Soviet 
Union government staked a claim to the region.97 The claim stated the 
following: 
All lands and islands, both discovered and which may be discovered 
in the future, which do not comprise at the time of publication of the 
present decree the territory of any foreign state recognized by the 
Government of the USSR, located in the northern Arctic Ocean, north 
of the shores of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics up to the 
North Pole between the meridian 32°04’35” E. long. from 
Greenwich, running along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the 
triangular marker on Cape Kekurskii, and the meridian 168°49’30” 
W. long. from Greenwich, bisecting the strait separating the 
Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands, of the Diomede group in the 
Bering Sea, are proclaimed to be territory of the USSR.98 
Russia has also claimed vast areas of the Arctic ice cap as its own 
territory based on a principle of international law known as the “sector 
 
93 See generally Ruddy, supra note 35. Res nullius means owned by no one, and it is 
considered by many as common to all. Id. 
94 On a technical note, Shaw distinguishes between res nullius (I equate terra nullius 
with res nullius) and res communis quite nicely in the following comment: 
Apart from territory actually under the sovereignty of a state, international law also 
recognises territory over which there is no sovereign. Such territory is known as terra 
nullius. In addition, there is a category of territory called res communis which is (in 
contrast to terra nullius) generally not capable of being reduced to sovereign control. 
The prime instance of this is the high seas, which belong to no-one and may be used 
by all. Another example would be outer space. 
SHAW, supra note 33, at 413. 
95 Thomas Renard, Russia in the Arctic: A Race for Oil or Patriotism?, NEW SECURITY 
BEAT (Nov. 8, 2007), http://newsecuritybeat.blogspot.com/2007/11/russia-in-arctic-race-
for-oil-or.html [https://perma.cc/K8VG-XU5A]. 
96 Russian Northern Expeditions (18th–19th Century), BEAUFORT GYRE EXPLORATION 
PROJECT, https://www.whoi.edu/beaufortgyre/history/history_russian1819.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZC6Q-JQR3] (last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
97 LASSI HEININEN, ALEXANDER SERGUNIN & GLEB YAROVOY, RUSSIAN STRATEGIES 
IN THE ARCTIC: AVOIDING A NEW COLD WAR 50 (Valdai Discussion Club 2014). 
98 Leonid Timtchenko, The Russian Arctic Sectoral Concept: Past and Present,  
50 ARCTIC 29, 30 (1997). 
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theory” (also referred to as “sector principle”),99 which involves the 
drawing of a triangle: the two sides beginning at the edge of the 
territorial land border and, in this case, going up to the North Pole. This 
“sector principle” has also been used by Canada, which asserts that its 
Arctic lands give it sovereignty over a triangular sector extended from 
the most northeastern and northwestern points of their Arctic baseline 
to the North Pole.100 As the two Arctic states with the largest land 
masses adjacent to the Arctic Ocean, it is both logical and advantageous 
for Russia and Canada to seek application of the “sector principle” and 
equally compelling for the Arctic states with smaller Arctic coastlines 
to oppose it. 
Concerning the application of the “sector principle” in the Arctic, 
many American and British jurists find that the theory is “not generally 
accepted under international law and the legality of any territorial 
claims based upon this theory must be doubted, although it may be 
noted that other Arctic states have applied the theory to various 
extents.”101 However, based on the concepts of both contiguity and 
proportionality, it can be argued that the fairest means of assigning 
sovereignty in the Arctic region—if it is to be assigned via international 
law—is on the basis of the sector principle.102 This contrasts with the 
alternative regimes of res communis—which permits freedom of 
access, exploration, and exploitation—or a common heritage regime 
that “would strictly regulate exploration and exploitation, would 
establish management mechanisms, and would employ the criterion of 
equity in distributing the benefits of such activity”103 for the benefit of 
the world. 
Both approaches are reminiscent of the fabled story of the “tragedy 
of the commons,” which, as an economic theory, asserts that resources 
left in common management and owned by no one will ultimately 
 
99 Use has been made of the concept of contiguity to assert claims over areas forming 
geographical units with those already occupied, in the form of the so-called sector 
principle. This is based on meridians of longitude as they converge at the North Pole and 
as they are placed on the coastlines of the particular nations, thus producing a series of 
triangular sectors with the coasts of the Arctic states as their baselines. 
SHAW, supra note 33, at 455–56. 
100 Alexander Proelss & Till Müller, The Legal Regime of the Arctic Ocean,  
68 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 
[ZAÖRV] 651, 655 (2008) (Ger.). 
101 STEVEN WHEATLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (Blackstone Press 1996); see Currie, 
supra note 45. 
102 Stephanie Holmes, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty,  
9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 323, 345 (2008). 
103 SHAW, supra note 33, at 454. 
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suffer a rapid demise as competition versus proprietorship over finite 
assets will prevail.104 In essence, humans will rush to use a limited 
resource owned by no one but rather held in common by all. They 
believe that by not using it themselves, someone else will come along 
and use it first, thus promoting the competitive view of using a limited 
resource for your own benefit before you are excluded by someone 
else.105 This Article argues that if the Arctic seabed is owned by the 
Arctic states under a sovereign basis, and ownership is determined 
using the sector principle, then the “freedom of the seas” navigation 
principle would remain unaffected when applied to areas beyond the 
Arctic nations’ territorial seas. 
With the melting polar ice, the Arctic region has become of strategic 
importance, representing a vast region of otherwise inhospitable 
territory between North America and Russia.106 The military defense 
and national security concerns from climate change and improved 
navigation mean global access has taken on new dimensions that 
represent a potential challenge to all the Arctic states. As such, control 
of the Arctic has taken on new significance beyond solely mineral, oil 
and gas, and shipping access.107 
The Russian Navy has stated the following: 
One of the key elements of the concept of a unipolar world 
(globalisation) is the joint efforts of countries on the Atlantic 
periphery in a military-political union (NATO) to establish control 
over the world’s sea communications, to win and maintain 
dominance at sea, and to expand maritime threats to, primarily, 
Russia, China and India . . . Hence NATO’s emphasis on naval power 
as a counterweight to the enormous land power of the Eurasian states 
. . . Even if the likelihood of a major war is now small, the possibility 
of a series of local maritime conflicts aimed at gaining access to and 
control over Russian maritime resources, primarily hydrocarbons, is 
entirely likely.108 
 
104 Mark Griffiths & Jill Kickul, The Tragedy of the Commons, IVEY BUS. J. (Mar./Apr. 
2013), https://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/the-tragedy-of-the-commons  
[https://perma.cc/VK78-9JL6]. 
105 Barry Schwartz, Tyranny for the Commons Man, NAT’L INT. ONLINE (June 23, 
2009), https://nationalinterest.org/article/tyranny-for-the-commons-man-3153  
[https://perma.cc/XRG5-6U4G]. 
106 SHAW, supra note 33, at 422. 
107 Luiza Ch. Savage, Why Everyone Wants a Piece of the Arctic, MACLEAN’S (May 13, 
2013), https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/why-the-world-wants-the-arctic  
[https://perma.cc/EQ47-SSW5]. 
108 KEIR GILES, Looking North, in RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC: THE “LAST DASH NORTH” 
10, 15 (2007). 
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It is also quite significant to note that, politically, it is only via the 
Arctic seas that Russia has full, open access to the high seas, and it has 
been argued that—to a large extent—“the basis for Russia’s future and 
socioeconomic stability and security is now being laid down in 
developing the resources and spaces of the Arctic.”109 See Figure 3. For 
instance, modern defensive infrastructure will be installed along the 
Russian Northern Sea Route (e.g., observation points, space and ground 
surveillance, and operational research).110 Also, the Russian Navy’s 
current building program should make it the world’s second largest by 
2027 (e.g., 25% of massively increased Russian procurement budget is 
for building new ships).111 A new generation of Russian aircraft carriers 
has also been announced.112 
From a geopolitical security and defense perspective, it is 
disconcerting that the United States has over 1000 miles of Alaskan 
coastline (including the Bering Strait, a gateway to the Arctic Ocean)113 
and a navy that may be as large as the next thirteen navies in the world 
combined,114 but owns only three nonnuclear115 icebreaking vessels 
(two heavy and one medium icebreakers). In comparison, “[w]ith 46 
vessels, including six nuclear-powered models, Russia already has the 
world’s largest fleet of icebreakers by far. A distant second place, with 
10 ships, goes to Finland. Canada has seven, as does Sweden.”116 
Historically, it is interesting to note that the Arctic region was the 
world’s most militarized maritime space due to the large presence of 
 
109 Id. at 10. 
110 Id. at 16–17. 
111 See Michael Peck, Russia Says It Will Add 180 New Warships by 2027 (But There Is 
a Big Problem), NAT’L INT. ONLINE (Apr. 4, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ 
russia-says-it-will-add-180-new-warships-2027-there-big-problem-50587  
[https://perma.cc/26G5-F7HY]. 
112 Nikolai Litovkin, Why Is Russia Creating the Biggest Aircraft Carrier in the World?, 
RUSSIA BEYOND (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.rbth.com/defence/2017/04/13/why-is-russia-
creating-the-biggest-aircraft-carrier-in-the-world_741689 [https://perma.cc/83TA-H4S3]. 
113 Peter J. Davies et al., Bering Sea and Strait, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https:// 
www.britannica.com/place/Bering-Sea [https://perma.cc/L9MU-RSYK] (last visited Feb. 
23, 2020). 
114 Larry Abramson, How Big Should the U.S. Navy Be?, NPR (Oct. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2012/10/22/163419358/what-does-the-navys-size-tells-about-u-s-
power [https://perma.cc/2D3W-NWXA]. 
115 See generally Polar Icebreaker Program; Record of Decision for the Polar Security 
Cutter Environmental Impact Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. 13,050 (Mar. 29, 2019). 
116 Jeremiah Jacques, Russian Icebreakers and the War for the Arctic, TRUMPET (Apr. 
18, 2019), https://www.thetrumpet.com/20548-russian-icebreakers-and-the-war-for-the-
arctic [https://perma.cc/2829-L7BL]. 
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nuclear submarines and intercontinental missiles during World War II 
and the Cold War.117 
The millennial boom in energy and commodity prices has changed 
exploration economics for oil, gas, and minerals (e.g., steadily 
shrinking polar ice and Arctic access).118 New sea lines are emerging 
with ships now able to pass directly over the North Pole, through ice- 
free waters for a short duration during the summer months, which 
shortens a circumpolar shipping route, saving Russia’s Northern Sea 
Route and the Canadian Northwest Passage five thousand to eight 
thousand miles.119 See Figure 3.  
 
117 Borgerson, supra note 5, at 68–69. 
118 See generally STEFAN FOURNIER & MARGARET CARON-VUOTARI, CHANGING 
TIDES: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CANADA’S NORTHERN MARINE WATERS (Conf. Bd. 
of Can. Oct. 2013). 
119 Peter Tyson, Future of the Passage, NOVA (Feb. 2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ 
nova/arctic/passage.html [https://perma.cc/9JN4-TA6G]. 
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Figure 3. Map of status of Arctic waters beyond 200 nautical miles from shore.120 
Essentially, the Russian Northern Sea Route reduces the shipping 
“distance between Rotterdam and Yokohama from 11,200 nautical 
miles—via the current route, through the Suez Canal—to only 6,500 
nautical miles.”121 This reduction in shipping distance translates into a 
significant savings in time and money (e.g., savings of canal fees, fuel 
costs, and other variable costs that determine freight rates).122 In 
essence, the estimated costs of a single voyage would be cut by $17.5 
million or more.123 Savings would also be greater for mega ships that 
are unable to fit through the Panama and Suez Canals as they currently 
 
120 Reprinted by permission from IBRU, supra note 86, full color version available at 
http://www.durham.ac.uk/ibru/resources/arctic [https://perma.cc/3XPD-XPFM]. 
121 Borgerson, supra note 5, at 69. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 69–70. 
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sail around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn.124 Also, sailing the 
Arctic is arguably safer for commercial and military vessels than the 
politically unstable Middle East waters and pirate-infested South China 
Sea.125 
“[T]he world’s shipyards are already building ice-capable ships. The 
private sector is investing billions of dollars in a fleet of Arctic 
tankers.”126 The private sector is focusing on 
the development of cutting-edge technology and the construction of 
new types of ships, such as double-acting tankers, which can steam 
[ahead] bow first through open water and then turn around and 
proceed stern first to smash through ice. These new ships can sail 
unhindered to the Arctic’s burgeoning oil and gas fields without the 
aid of icebreakers. Such breakthroughs are revolutionizing Arctic 
shipping and turning what were once commercially unviable projects 
into booming businesses.127 
The Arctic resource development and exploration activity described 
above should come as no wonder as it is reported that the Russian-
controlled Gazprom has approximately “113 trillion cubic feet of gas 
already under development in Barents Sea fields” and that the territory 
recently claimed by Russia may contain as much as 586 billion barrels 
of oil (unproven).128 In contrast, all of Saudi Arabia’s proven oil 
reserves equals approximately 260 billion barrels.129 It is also 
significant to note that Russia gets 90% of its gas, 60% of its oil, greater 
 
124 Implications for International Shipping, CLIMATE POL’Y WATCH, https://www. 
climate-policy-watcher.org/natural-resources/implications-for-international-shipping.html 
[https://perma.cc/3M37-Z8MY] (last updated Aug. 13, 2019). 
125 Borgerson, supra note 5, at 70. 
126 Id. at 71. 
127 Id. (alteration in original). 
As soon as marine insurers recalculate the risks involved in these voyages, trans-
Arctic shipping will become commercially viable and begin on a large scale. In an 
age of just-in-time delivery, and with increasing fuel costs eating into the profits of 
shipping companies, reducing long-haul sailing distances by as much as 40 percent 
could usher in a new phase of globalization. Arctic routes would force further 
competition between the Panama and Suez Canals, thereby reducing current canal 
tolls; shipping chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca would no longer dictate 
global shipping patterns; and Arctic seaways would allow for greater international 
economic integration. When the ice recedes enough, likely within this decade, a 
marine highway directly over the North Pole will materialize. 
Id. at 70. 
128 Id. at 67–68. 
129 Id. at 68. 
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than 90% of its nickel and cobalt, 60% of its copper, and 98% of its 
platinum metals from its Arctic region.130 
The Arctic Ocean could contain 25% of the world’s undiscovered 
oil and gas,131 and, as noted in the U.K.’s Guardian on June 28, 2007, 
Russia already has the world’s largest gas reserves and is the second 
largest exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia, and Putin is keen to secure 
Russia’s hegemony over global markets and to find new sources of 
fuel.132 
The U.N. rejected Moscow’s first claim on the Lomonosov Ridge 
continental shelf extension in 2001 due to lack of scientific proof.133 In 
2007, Russia sent a scientific expedition to the North Pole which 
garnered attention and consternation by littoral states when Russia 
planted its flag on the North Pole.134 The Lomonosov Ridge is “a 1,240 
mile long underwater mountain range that spans the length of its polar 
region . . . [which Russia asserts] is actually an extension of the 
Siberian shelf and therefore Russia should be granted exclusive 
economic rights to it.”135 After using scientific data it collected, Russia 
resubmitted its claim in 2015.136 Its revised bid includes an underwater 
seabed area of over 463,000 square miles and extends 350 nautical 
miles from the shore, which includes claims for Lomonosov Ridge, the 
Mendeleev-Alpha Ridge, and the Chuchi Plateau.137 
B. Denmark’s (Greenland) Arctic and Lomonosov Ridge Claims 
The Kingdom of Denmark is composed of three parts of the unity of 
the Realm—Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands—and, by 
virtue of Greenland, is centrally located as a coastal state in the 
 
130 MARK A. SMITH, Russia and the Arctic: The New Great Game, in RUSSIA AND THE 
ARCTIC: THE “LAST DASH NORTH” 1, 1 (2007). 
131 Id. 
132 Luke Harding, Kremlin Lays Claim to Huge Chunk of Oil-Rich North Pole,  
GUARDIAN (June 28, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/28/russia.oil  
[https://perma.cc/6Y8C-429W]. 
133 Robyn Winz, Lomonosov Shelf, Arctic Claims, and Climate Change, MANDALA 
PROJECTS (May 2013), http://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/lomonosov.htm  
[https://perma.cc/PBG8-LWPN]. 
134 Id. 
135 Andy Deahn, Arctic Geopolitics: Future Conflict Beyond the Caspian, MOD. DIPL. 
(Sept. 4, 2015), https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2015/09/04/arctic-geopolitics-future-conflict-
beyond-the-caspian [https://perma.cc/9DC4-M53G]. 
136 Id. 
137 Russia Submits Revised Claims for Extending Arctic Shelf to UN, RT QUESTION 
MORE (Feb. 10, 2018, 10:45 PM), https://www.rt.com/news/332089-russia-arctic-claim-un 
[https://perma.cc/2QV8-G7LQ] [hereinafter Russia Submits Claims]. 
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Arctic.138 “[B]oth the Faroe Islands and Greenland have extensive self-
government” and a devolved set of legislative and administrative 
powers from Denmark.139 
“The Faroe Islands and Greenland have had home rule since 1948 
and 1979, respectively.”140 Home rule legislation has been modernized, 
most recently in the Faroe Islands by the Takeover Act of the Faroe 
Islands, the Act on the Power of Matters and Fields of Responsibility, 
and the Foreign Policy Act on the Faroes Islands of 2005 and in 
Greenland by the Greenland Self-Government Act of 2009.141 
“Considerable parts of the separation of powers that are central in an 
Arctic context are matters that fall within the exclusive powers of the 
respective Faroese and the Greenland authorities.”142 Greenland has 
authority over mineral resources.143 Also, exploration, development, 
and exploitation of resources in Greenland are authorized by the 
Greenlandic authorities.144 “However, revenues from mineral activities 
will benefit both the Greenland and Danish people, given that cf. Self-
Government Act for Greenland there will be a reduction of the annual 
block grant in line with possible revenues from mineral resources.”145 
In December 2014, Denmark, through its territorial hold over 
Greenland, staked a claim of about 350,000 square miles of continental 
shelf in the Arctic, contending that its data shows Greenland’s 
continental shelf connected to the Lomonosov Ridge.146 To date, 
Denmark has submitted five Arctic continental shelf extension  
claims to the U.N.: (1) a submission for north of the Faroe Islands in 
2009; (2) a submission for south of the Faroe Islands in 2010; (3) a 
submission for south of Greenland in 2013; (4) a submission for 
northeast of Greenland; and (5) most recently, a submission for 
 
138 DENMARK, GREENLAND AND THE FAROE ISLANDS: KINGDOM OF DENMARK 
STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC 2011–2020, at 7 (Ministry Foreign Aff. Aug. 2011), 
https://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Images/Udenrigsdirektoratet/100295_Arktis_Ra
pport_UK_210x270_Final_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQ2S-7FYU]. 
139 Id. at 10. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Krishnadev Calamur, Denmark Claims Part of the Arctic, Including the North Pole, 
NPR (Dec. 15, 2014, 1:39 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/15/ 
370980109/denmark-claims-part-of-the-arctic-including-the-north-pole%20Dec.%2015, 
%202014 [https://perma.cc/ELM7-WYNQ]. 
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Lomonosov Ridge, north of Greenland in 2014.147 Several other 
disputed Arctic areas between Russia and Canada and “parts of 
Amundsen Basin, the Lomonosov Ridge, Makarov-Podvodnikov 
Basins and Mendeleev Rise are also claimed by Denmark as an 
extension of Greenland.”148 
“The submission of our claim to the continental shelf north of 
Greenland is a historic and important milestone for . . . Denmark . . . . 
The objective of this huge project is to define the outer limits of our 
continental shelf and . . . of the Kingdom of Denmark.”149 The 2014 
Lomonosov Ridge claim is an assumed natural prolongation of 
northern Greenland.150 If this claim is successful, Denmark would 
expand its EEZ, which would enable Denmark to exercise control of 
shipping, mining, and drilling rights within 200 nautical miles of the 
Lomonosov Ridge.151 Since 2008, Denmark also has an ongoing 
strategic partnership with China,152 which, in 2018, released its white 
paper on the Arctic, and Denmark plans to make extensive use of 
developing Arctic shipping routes.153 “The document also encapsulated 
Beijing’s emerging goals in the far north as the need to ‘understand, 
protect, develop, and participate in the governance of the Arctic.’ ”154 
Chinese firms have been investing in Greenland’s emerging mineral 
wealth that is becoming more accessible due to climate change, and 
Chinese firms are being considered for the expansion of three airports 
 
147 Id. 
148 Russia Submits Claims, supra note 137. 
149 Denmark and Greenland Will Today File a Submission Regarding the Continental 
Shelf North of Greenland, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. DEN., https://um.dk/en/news/ 
newsdisplaypage/?newsid=71574e42-6115-4d16-9c8a-4c056f8603f3 [https://perma.cc/ 
D8BS-9SGX] (last visited Feb. 23, 2019). 
150 Christian Marcussen et al., Exploring for Extended Continental Shelf Claims Off 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands–Geological Perspectives, 4 GEOLOGICAL SURV. DEN. & 
GREEN. BULL. 61, 63 (2004).  
151 Wendy Koch, Denmark Eyes North Pole, but How Much Oil and Gas Await?, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/12/ 
141217/oil-natural-gas-denmark-north-pole-arctic [https://perma.cc/CV3M-PKTW]. 
152 See generally Andreas Bøje Forsby, Denmark and China as Strategic Partners: An 
Odd Couple’s Quest for Bilateral Harmony, in CHINA AND NORDIC POLICY 27 (Bjørnar 
Sverdrup-Thygeson, Wrenn Yennie Lindgren & Marc Lanteigne eds., 2017). 
153 Ekaterina Klimenko, Shipping Along the Arctic’s Northern Sea Route Will Be 
Determined by Russia–China Cooperation in the Region, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. 
INST. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.sipri.org/commentary/expert-comment/2018/shipping-
along-arctics-northern-sea-route-will-be-determined-russia-china-cooperation-region 
[https://perma.cc/9VGP-HLAB]. 
154 Marc Lanteigne & Mingming Shi, China Stakes Its Claim to the Arctic, DIPLOMAT 
(Jan. 29, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/china-stakes-its-claim-to-the-arctic 
[https://perma.cc/X4LX-6CPA]. 
MACNEILL(DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/20  7:31 PM 
2020] A Trip to Lomonosov Ridge: The Arctic,  257 
UNCLOS, and “Off the Shelf” Sovereignty Claims 
on Greenland’s sparsely populated island.155 However, there have been 
diplomatic concerns because the United States, which operates a 
military base at Thule in northern Greenland, may have homeland 
security issues with these projects.156 
C. Canada’s Arctic and Lomonosov Ridge Claims 
Canada has also long argued that it owns a large part of the Arctic.157 
In 1946, the Canadian Ambassador to the United States Lester B. 
Pearson (who later became Prime Minister of Canada and a Nobel 
Peace Prize recipient) stated the following: 
A large part of the world’s total Arctic area is Canadian. One should 
know exactly what this part comprises. It includes not only Canada’s 
northern mainland, but the islands and the frozen sea north of the 
mainland between the meridians of its east and west boundaries, 
extended to the North Pole.158 
In addition to Canada’s dispute with Russia over its Lomonosov 
Ridge claim, Canada, which filed a similar claim with UNCLOS in 
May 2019,159 also disagrees with Denmark’s 2014 UNCLOS claim to 
the Lomonosov Ridge. However, both Denmark and Canada argue that 
the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the Northern American/ 
Greenlandic continental shelf—not the Russian shelf.160 Canada is also 
engaged in riparian, sovereignty, and maritime delimitation disputes in 
at least four other areas of the Arctic: (1) the Northwest Passage,161 
 
155 Greenland’s Airports: A Balance Between China and Denmark?, OVER CIRCLE 
 (June 15, 2018), https://overthecircle.com/2018/06/15/greenlands-airports-a-balance-
between-china-and-denmark [https://perma.cc/824L-7A2Z]. 
156 Id. 
157 See generally T.E.M. McKitterick, The Validity of Territorial and Other Claims in 
Polar Regions, 21 J. COM. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 89, 89 (1939). Because of the “sector 
principle,” Canada became the first country to extend its boundaries northward to the North 
Pole. Russia and Norway have also made sector-based claims. Also, the U.S. has made a 
sector claim, but the claim has not been pressed. Id. 
158 Lester B. Pearson, Canada Looks Down North, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 638, 638–39 
(1946). 
159 Eilis Quinn, Canada Files Submission to Establish Continental Shelf Outer Limits in 
Arctic Ocean, EYE ON ARCTIC (May 24, 2019, 4:35 PM), https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-
arctic/2019/05/24/canada-files-submission-to-establish-continental-shelfs-outer-limits-in-
arctic-ocean [https://perma.cc/JP6T-GPQL]. 
160 See Borgerson, supra note 5, at 74. 
161 The United States and other countries (but not Russia) claim a right of passage 
through Arctic seas north of Canada’s land mass, which weaves through an archaeological 
maze of about 35,000 islands. Macneill, supra note 1, at 356. Meanwhile, Canada draws its 
northern boundary baseline around the outer shores of this archipelago rendering the Arctic  
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(2) the Beaufort Sea,162 (3) Hans Island,163 and (4) unresolved 
delimitation issues between Russia and Canada in the areas of the 
Makarov-Podvodnikov Basins and Mendeleev Rise.164 
The issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic obviously is neither 
new nor a simplistic geopolitical matter, and global warming and the 
retreat of the Arctic ice cap has elevated the issue forward as nations 
seem to be juxtaposing and scurrying to gain access to the region and 
its resources. In response, Canada “launched a satellite surveillance 
system designed to search for ships trespassing in its waters”165 and 
announced a new deep-water port (Port Nanisivik) and a military 
training base at Resolute Bay, with former Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper declaring that the first principle of Arctic sovereignty is “use it 
or lose it.”166 Subsequently, in 2017, Canada committed to constructing 
eight light icebreaking arctic patrol ships167 as part of its northern 
strategy to increase its military presence in the Arctic.168 
While Canada and the United States agreed to disagree with respect 
to their positions on the Northwest Passage, and with no agreement on 
the Beaufort Sea boundaries, under the Trump Administration the 
United States has been anxious to push ahead its Alaska and Beaufort 
 
to the south as inland internal waters, which in context contrasts the United States’ claim of 
right of passage. Id. 
162 This dispute is again between Canada and its littoral neighbor the United States and 
concerns the Canadian claim of a linear border extension into offshore region of the Beaufort 
Sea of the border between Alaska and Canada’s Yukon Territory, with the U.S. drawing its 
border at a different angle and giving it greater access to petroleum reserves in the region. 
See Currie, supra note 45, at 5. 
163 See John Ibbitson, Dispute Over Hans Island Nears Resolution. Now for the Beaufort 
Sea, GLOBE & MAIL (Jan. 26, 2011), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ 
dispute-over-hans-island-nears-resolution-now-for-the-beaufort-sea/article563692 [https:// 
perma.cc/45C6-UE85]. Hans Island is a 0.5-square-mile uninhabited rock, situated between 
Ellesmere Island (Canada) and Greenland (Denmark) in the Kennedy Channel, Naires Strait. 
The rock is significant because of its effect on each respective countries’ ability to extend 
its sovereignty rights over the resources in the region. Id. 
164 Russia Submits Claims, supra note 137. 
165 Borgerson, supra note 5, at 74. 
166 Kristin Bartenstein, “Use It or Lose It”: An Appropriate and Wise Slogan?,  
POL’Y OPTIONS, (July 1, 2010), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/immigration-jobs-
and-canadas-future/use-it-or-lose-it-an-appropriate-and-wise-slogan [https://perma.cc/ 
UF54-G229]. 
167 See Canada Begins Construction of Fourth Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship, 
NAVALTODAY.COM (May 6, 2019), https://navaltoday.com/2019/05/06/canada-begins-
construction-of-fourth-arctic-and-offshore-patrol-ship [https://perma.cc/E7B9-BNB5]. 
168 Adam Lajeunesse, The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, 
and Requirements, CANADIAN GLOBAL AFF. INST. (May 2015), https://www.cgai.ca/ 
canadian_armed_forces_in_the_arctic [https://perma.cc/5UXG-4SD6]. 
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Sea reserve leases.169 The United States has not yet ratified 
UNCLOS.170 A small majority within the Senate failed to ratify  
the convention in 2004.171 Once the United States ratifies UNCLOS, it 
is expected to submit a claim to the Arctic seabed of up to 200 miles 
off the coast of Alaska.172 Alternatively, if the United States does not 
ratify UNCLOS,173 “then Washington may not be able to present its 
claims.”174 
V 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To resolve the jurisdictional issues in the Arctic, this Article 
proposes several policy solutions: 
1) form a new international legal regime to protect the fragile Arctic 
region’s environment;175 
2) form a jurisdictional boundary around the Arctic Ocean using 
the baselines of the littoral countries;176 
3) form a moratorium on development in the region to help 
maintain the fragile ecosystem;177 
4) designate the Arctic Ocean north of the littoral baselines as an 
International Arctic Conservation Area;178 
5) develop a regional approach in the Arctic and settle outstanding 
boundary disputes; 
 
169 See Elizabeth Harball, Trump Administration Appeals Ruling That Blocked Arctic 
Offshore Drilling, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (May 28, 2019), https://www.ktoo.org/2019/05/28/ 
trump-administration-appeals-ruling-that-blocked-arctic-offshore-drilling 
[https://perma.cc/H2ZU-UU2H]. 
170 Mark J. Valencia, Might China Withdraw from the UN Law of the Sea Treaty?, 
DIPLOMAT (May 3, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/might-china-withdraw-from-
the-un-law-of-the-sea-treaty [https://perma.cc/X637-439Q]. 
171 See Elizabeth M. Hudzik, A Treaty on Thin Ice: Debunking the Arguments Against 
U.S. Ratification of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea in a Time of Global Climate 
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6) have the United States and Canada strike a deal to settle the 
Beaufort Sea boundary and the Northwest Passage dispute;179 
7) encourage western pan-Arctic cooperation (i.e., Bering Strait) 
between the United States and Russia180 (China, Japan, and 
Canada may also invest); and 
8) encourage eastern pan-Arctic cooperation between Canada, 
Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Norway, and Russia (United 
States may also partake). 
CONCLUSION 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention assigns significant undersea 
portions of the Arctic Ocean to Canada, the United States, Russia, 
Norway, and Denmark. These nations can claim the resources on, 
above, and beneath the ocean floor up to 200 miles from their baselines. 
Their claim can also be extended up to 350 miles for any area that is 
proven to be part of their continental shelf. All these nations have 
gained significant oil, gas, mineral, fish, and other precious resources 
as a result of this treaty. 
Implementing an international legal regime to protect the Arctic 
region through regulating transportation, exploration, and exploitation 
will be impossible unless states are willing to give up their right to 
control access to the Arctic seas or their sovereignty over the deep 
seabed’s natural resources. Two questions remain: (1) Is the global 
marketplace willing to limit or alter its consumption in order to protect 
the Arctic Ocean as well as the Arctic region?181 And, (2) will littoral 
Arctic states relinquish their resource sovereignty? 
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